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*J.S.S.L. 142 Benefit sanctions are now a central component of the UK’s increasingly conditional
social security system. Over the last two decades their reach has been extended beyond Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) claimants to include the majority of lone parents, many disabled people and, since
the introduction of Universal Credit ( UC) in 2013, low paid workers in receipt of in work wage
supplements and housing benefits. Utilising original data generated in a large (n.481 wave a), repeat
qualitative longitudinal panel study this paper explores the impact of benefit sanctions on the lives of
those in receipt of highly conditional social security benefits. It is concluded that benefit sanctions
routinely trigger a range of profoundly negative outcomes that do not enhance the likelihood of people
moving into paid work. 1
Introduction
Within social security benefit systems the application of welfare conditionality links eligibility to
continued receipt of work related benefits to claimants’ mandatory engagement with work focused
interviews (WFIs), training and support schemes and/or job search requirements, with failure to
undertake such specified activities leading to benefit sanctions.2 A key element of welfare reform in
many nations since the 1990s, welfare conditionality in various guises has been embraced by
governments in both high income nations3 and in many countries of the Global South.4 The UK has
long been at the forefront of this behavioural turn in social security policy that demands individual
benefit recipients must meet particular, *J.S.S.L. 143 compulsory, work focussed duties or patterns
of responsible behaviour in order to retain access to collectively provided social welfare provisions.5
Influenced by New Right6 and new Communitarian7 critics’ longstanding antipathy towards state
provided welfare entitlements derived from citizenship status,8 welfare conditionality was initially
embraced by the UK Conservative administrations of the late 1980s and 1990s. It was then
enthusiastically endorsed, embedded and expanded as a cornerstone of New Labour’s Third Way,
"no rights without responsibilities" welfare reform programme and has subsequently been further
intensified and extended by the UK Coalition Government and its Conservative successors. Today,
groups of benefit recipients who were previously largely exempt from welfare conditionality, including
many people in receipt of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) (the UK’s main incapacity
benefit for working aged disabled people), lone parents, and since 2013 under Universal Credit (UC)
low paid workers and their partners, find themselves subject to benefit sanctions if they fail to comply
with the work related conditions attached to their claim.9
Supporters of welfare conditionality believe that unconditional entitlement to public welfare benefits
and services promotes idleness and entrenches "welfare dependency" among a section of the
population.10 Welfare conditionality unequivocally realigns the relationship between entitlement to
state support and individual conduct/behaviour11:
"Conditionality embodies the principle that aspects of state support, usually financial or practical, are
dependent on citizens meeting certain conditions which are invariably behavioural." 12
Advocates, of conditionality look to use various combinations of "carrot" (the "offer" of mandatory
training and job search support), alongside the "stick" of benefit sanctions (reduction or removal of
right to benefit) to cajole or compel them into work. For example, in 2008, when outlining "a vision for
personalized conditionality", Professor Paul Gregg was clear that whilst personalised support
packages were an essential element of any conditional benefit regime, sanctions *J.S.S.L. 144 for
non-compliance remained both necessary and justified.13 Commissioned by a New Labour
Government to undertake a wide-ranging, independent review of conditionality in the benefit system
Gregg recommended, that "virtually everyone" claiming benefits should be required to undertake
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mandatory work search activities and be subject to benefit sanctions for non-compliance. Gregg was
endorsing recommendations made a year earlier in the Freud Report, which called for:
"Stronger conditionality in line with the Jobseeker’s Allowance for lone parents with progressively
younger children and moving to deliver conditionality for other groups (including people already on
incapacity benefits)." 14
Convinced of both the ethicality and effectiveness of welfare conditionality these government
sponsored reviews helped set in train the subsequent extension of compulsory work related
requirements and benefit sanctions to groups of people (e.g. lone parents and disabled people) who
were previously excluded from them. More recently, in 2016, the then Conservative Secretary of State
for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith mounted a strong defence of benefit sanctions by linking
their use to high UK employment levels while also claiming (erroneously) that three quarters of those
who had received a sanction reported it helped them "focus and get on".15 The use or threat of benefit
sanctions is viewed as effective and justified as it will help reduce reliance on social security and
simultaneously promote individual responsibility by pushing benefit claimants into paid work.
Conversely, critics of welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions in particular, argue that advocates
are wrong to prioritise individual behaviour as both the main cause and solution to a narrowly defined
notion of welfare dependency; wider structural factors also need to be taken into account when
understanding unemployment and inequality.16 They also suggest that many vulnerable people are
often unable to respond rationally to the "carrots" or "sticks" to which they are subject.17 Others
highlight the ineffectiveness of benefit sanctions in moving people into work, with the disciplinary and
highly punitive impacts disproportionality borne by poor people whose social exclusion and poverty is
further exacerbated by the application of benefit sanctions.18 In short, welfare conditionality and its
central instrument of compliance, benefit sanctions, are seen as ethically unjustifiable,19 punitive and
ineffective. *J.S.S.L. 145
As discussions above illustrate, debates about the effectiveness and ethicality of benefit sanctions
within highly conditional social security systems are ongoing. The key aim of this paper is to consider
the impacts of benefit sanctions on the lives of those in receipt of social security benefits in the UK; a
nation in which "work first" welfare conditionality has become entrenched. The first part of the paper
provides context and offers a brief account of the recent expansion and intensification of benefit
sanctions within the UK’s working age social security system before setting out an overview of the
benefit sanction regime at its heart. The second outlines the methods used to generate the original
empirical data that informs subsequent discussions. The third part highlights the profoundly negative
and routinely detrimental impacts that benefit sanctions have on peoples’ lives. Finally, I consider the
extent to which benefit sanctions enhance or inhibit claimants’ movements off welfare and into work.
Grounded in analysis of the accounts of those who have been threatened with, or been subject to, a
benefit sanction(s) the paper provides powerful evidence of the punitive and ineffective outcomes—in
respect of movements into paid work—that the application of benefit sanctions consistently trigger.
Benefit sanctions in the UK social security system
In recent decades the endorsement of welfare conditionality by UK mainstream political parties has
led to a situation whereby the majority of working aged recipients of out of work social security
benefits are now subject to the threat of benefit sanctions for non-compliance with the work related
conditions attached to their claims. It is important to note, however, that the increased severity and
expansion of contemporary benefit sanctions are comparatively recent developments within UK
welfare policy. Since its inception in 1911 receipt of unemployment benefit in the UK has always been
conditional on claimants signing on at the labour exchange and declaring that they were actively
looking for work. As such, conditionality for recipients of unemployment benefit is not new. However,
throughout the 1980s and 1990s consecutive Conservative Governments made unemployment
benefits increasingly conditional by requiring claimants to attend regular "restart" interviews and the
introduction of the Jobseekers Act 1995 is often regarded as a defining moment in the advance of the
sanctions-based social security system that exists today. This legislation created the Jobseeker’s
Agreement (subsequently renamed the Claimant Commitment under UC), which specified the steps
each JSA claimant had to undertake when looking for work. Additionally, Jobcentre Plus advisers
were empowered to require claimants to alter their appearance or behaviour if they felt it prejudiced
an individual’s chance of finding work. Failure to comply with any set conditions could lead to
disqualification from benefit.20 Today this approach has developed into a system whereby able-bodied
JSA and UC claimants (see discussions below) may be subject to full work related requirements, i.e.
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up to 35 hours’ job search and preparation per week including compulsory attendance at WFIs or
training courses.
Like the Jobseekers Act 1995 the introduction of ESA by the New Labour Government in 2007 was a
watershed moment for those in receipt of long-term *J.S.S.L. 146 incapacity benefits, which made
many disabled people subject to work related requirements and benefit sanctions for the first time.
Under ESA the functional capacities of each claimant are initially assessed by application of the much
criticised21 Work Capability Assessment (WCA), with three possible outcomes. Those found "fit for
work" are subject to the full work related requirements noted above. Individuals assessed as having
"limited capability for work", but deemed likely to be capable of paid employment moving forward, are
placed in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) and must undertake any steps as instructed to
prepare for paid work in the future. In both of these outcomes, failure to undertake the personalised
work related requirements as specified in the Claimant Commitment results in the application of
benefit sanctions. Finally, people assessed as having "limited capability for work and work related
activity" due to higher levels of impairment are not liable to benefit sanction and exempted from all
work search and preparation requirements.22
The extension of conditionality for lone parent claimants is also a relatively recent occurrence. Prior to
2001, lone parents with children aged under 16 years were routinely able to claim Income Support
(IS), were not required to actively seek work and were not liable to benefit sanction. However, since
the early 2000s successive governments gradually moved lone parents off IS onto JSA, while
simultaneously reducing the age of youngest child thresholds at which lone parents must undertake
various work preparation requirements or risk being sanctioned.23 Spencer notes that from April 2017,
under changes introduced in the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016:
"Parents of three and four-year-olds will be expected to be available for and actively seeking work.
Parents of two-year-olds will be required to attend work-focused interviews and will be subject to a
work preparation requirement, while parents of one-year-olds will continue to be required to attend
work-focused interviews." 24
The advent of UC further extended the reach of conditionality and signalled the durability of
sanctioning as a core component of future UK social security policy. Piloted since 2013, with
completion of its much delayed full rollout now scheduled for March 2023, UC was introduced with the
linked aims of simplifying the benefits system, making work pay, increasing benefit take-up and
reducing fraud and error.25 UC is a single monthly payment that replaces six existing means tested
payments for working age people, i.e. Income Support, Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance,
Income-Related Employment Support Allowance,26 Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working
Tax Credit. The inclusion of the last three payments is *J.S.S.L. 147 significant, as these are rent
and wage supplements available to low paid workers rather than out of work benefits for people who
are not active in the paid labour market.27 Consequently, UC heralds the onset a new era of in-work
conditionality which "extends full-time job search/work requirements, backed by sanctions",28 to low
paid workers and their partners for the first time.
One outcome of delays in the full operational rollout of UC is that, at present, there are effectively
three parallel sanctioning systems currently in operation in the UK. Consequently, some minor
variations regarding length and severity of sanction, access to hardship payments and rules on
easement of work related conditions for vulnerable groups presently remain, dependant on whether
an individual is still on legacy benefits (i.e. ESA/JSA) or in receipt of UC.29 The direction of travel in
respect of benefit sanctions is, however, very clear. In October 2012, in preparation for the imminent
introduction of UC, the Conservative/Liberal Coalition Government launched an enhanced benefit
sanction regime with tougher penalties for those who fail to punctually attend WFIs or who do not
meet their personalised work preparation or job search requirements. Sanctions ranged from a loss of
full benefit for four weeks, for an initial low level transgression (e.g. non-attendance at a WFI), to up to
three years loss of entitlement for a repeat third, high level offence such as failure to apply for a job.30
Building on this, Table 1 below illustrates the single system of sanctions envisaged once UC becomes
fully operational.
Table 1: Summary of Universal Credit sanctions (and sanctions under Contribution based JSA and
contributory ESA, when UC is introduced)31
Level of Sanction Length of Sanction
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First failure Second failure within
a year
Third failure within a
year
High level sanctions
(UC and JSA only)
91 days 182 days 1, 095 days *J.S.S.L.
148
• Failing to undertake
Mandatory Work
Activity.
• Failing to apply for or
to accept paid work.
• Ceasing paid work or
loosing pay for specified
reasons.
Level of Sanction Length of Sanction
First failure Second failure within
a year
Third failure within a
year
Medium level sanctions
(UC and JSA only)
28 days 91 days 91 days
• Failing to be available
for paid work or to take











• Failing to meet a WFI
requirement.
• Failing to comply with
a requirement
connected to a work
related requirement.
• Failing to meet a work
preparation
requirement.
• failing to take a
particular action to get
paid work (UC and JSA
only).
Lowest level sanctions
(UC and ESA only)
Until claimant complies Until claimant complies Until claimant complies
• Failing to meet a WFI
requirement.
Comparison of the UC sanction regime with that in operation for those mandated to take part in the
"New Deal for Young People" (NDYP)32 in 2002 offers an insight into the distance sanctioning policy
in the UK has travelled in less than 20 years. Considered at the time to be "the toughest sanction
regime ever seen in the UK",33 claimants faced a 14 days loss of some or all their benefit for a first
transgression, depending on their personal circumstances. This increased to 28 days for a second
failure to attend/actively seek work, rising to 100% loss of benefit for 182 days for a third offence.
Furthermore, consideration of some statistics further illustrates the unprecedented extent to which the
application of benefit sanctions has become a routine component of policy. In 2001, some 300,000
benefit sanctions were imposed on JSA claimants. By 2013, the number had dramatically increased
by over 245% from their 2001 level, to a peak of 1,037,00034 as part of the "great sanctions drive"35
when approximately 25% of JSA claimants experienced a sanction in the period between 2010 and
2015.36 Benefit sanctions are now a core component of the highly conditional, "work first" 21st
Century UK welfare state.37 Before considering the evidence of their impacts and consequences the
next section offers a short methods note. *J.S.S.L. 149
Methods
Ensuing discussions draw directly on original qualitative data generated in a large qualitative
longitudinal panel study undertaken with a diversity of welfare service users (WSUs) subject to
welfare conditionality. This was a core element of the ESRC funded "Welfare Conditionality: Sanction,
Support and Behaviour Change" (WelCond) project which explores the ethics and efficacy of
conditional welfare interventions. Within policy research, qualitative longitudinal research is an
appropriate method for considering changes (or their absence), that may be occurring over time,
exploring how they arise, and explaining how and why there may be diverse outcomes for different
members of a sampled population.38
The qualitative longitudinal sample consisted of nine different groups (panels) of WSUs subject to
varying types and degrees of welfare conditionality. These were recipients of working age social
security benefits (jobseekers, lone parents, disabled people, Universal Credit, both in- and
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out-of-work claimants), homeless people, social tenants, people subject to anti-social behaviour
orders/family intervention programmes, offenders and migrants. Suitable respondents were
purposively sampled according to a range of appropriate criteria pertinent to each group under
consideration. The repeat interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2017 in 11 locations in
England and Scotland, with respondents interviewed up to three times with, on average, a 12 month
gap between interviews across a 24 month period. An overall total of 1,082 interviews were
undertaken (481 at wave a, 339 at wave b and 262 at wave c), with a retention rate of approximately
70% between each wave.
Two principles, informed consent and anonymity, underpinned the fieldwork. Before each interview,
individuals were provided with an information sheet, given the opportunity to ask questions and made
aware of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. Issues relating to consent were revisited
prior to each wave of interview through the use of written consent forms. Interpreters and translated
materials were available as required. WSUs who participated in the fieldwork received a £20
shopping voucher after each interview as a thank you for taking part. All interviews were audio
recorded, transcribed verbatim and English language transcripts produced. Appropriate anonymised
code numbers were assigned to each transcript, e.g. BR-LS-012a.39 Two complementary approaches
informed data analysis. To enable temporal analysis across the wider sample, a common coding
schema was developed for application across all sampled groups and data was summarised using a
framework matrix approach40 and QSR NVivo software. Additionally, "bottom up" thematic analysis of
each transcript was undertaken.
186 of the 481 WSUs initially sampled for the first round of repeat interviews spoke of previously
experiencing a benefit sanction in discussions at wave a *J.S.S.L. 150 interview; of these 104 had
been sanctioned once, 69 between two and five times, with 13 reporting receiving more than five
sanctions in the past. As the project progressed there was a significant reduction in the number of
new sanctions discussed by respondents. At wave b, 35 WSUs reported new benefit sanction(s)
being applied since their previous interview, 29 being sanctioned on a single occasion, five two to five
times, with a single person sanctioned more than five times. In our final wave c fieldwork, nine
reported being sanctioned once since their interview the previous year, with another single
respondent speaking of receiving multiple sanctions in the intervening period.
The high initial incidence of sanctioning and its subsequent significant reduction in waves b and c is
likely due to a number of factors. First, at wave a WSUs were retrospectively discussing sanctions
that they had previously been subject to at any time prior to their first interview; at waves b and c they
were asked to focus on new benefit sanctions that occurred in the shorter-term period between
interview waves. Secondly, the timing of the wave a interviews broadly coincided with the historically
unprecedented national rise in benefit sanctions that occurred following the introduction of the new
harsher regime in October 2012; later waves were undertaken when national sanction rates fell from
this peak. Thirdly, greater awareness of the dire consequences of a sanction enabled some to avoid
their application moving forward. However, as later discussions illustrate, despite fewer sanctions
being applied, across the sample the fear of a future sanction remained very real.
Universally negative: the experience and impact of benefit sanctions
Across the sample, and throughout the three waves of repeat interviews, benefit sanctions were
repeatedly and universally reported as triggering profoundly negative outcomes. Severely detrimental,
financial, emotional and health impacts41 routinely ensued for those who were sanctioned, with other
family members, including children also often suffering42:
"My daughter could not attend school for two weeks. I didn’t have any money … you have to give her
some money every day for some lunch and for a bus." (Male migrant, Scotland, wave a)
"Can’t afford to eat at the moment … [my son] like he’ll eat my food … He even says, ‘Why aren’t you
eating?’ ‘I ate earlier.’" (Female lone parent, England, wave a)
"[Sanction] took me further down the depression route … suicidal thoughts … I’d rather starve than
deal with this." (Homeless woman, England, wave c) *J.S.S.L. 151
"[The hospital] were saying ‘you’ve lost weight’. I said ‘Well I can’t eat I’ve got no food, no money.’"
(Disabled man, England, wave a)
Benefit sanctions worked to further compound and ingrain the poverty that was already a feature of
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many people’s lives. Increased debt, including rent and utility arrears, borrowing and reliance on
charitable and informal and familial networks (in situations where people were able to access them)
and/or repayable local authority crisis loans were common outcomes. Typically, many were placed in
situations where they had to weigh one basic need against another and go without essential items in
order to survive the crisis that a benefit sanction triggered43:
"My gas and electric fell into that much arrears … I was without heating for ages … I pawned
everything I had … You’re literally going, ‘Do I eat or do I have light?’"(Female lone parent, Scotland,
wave a)
In certain instances, benefit sanctions set in place a train of events that directly led to homelessness,
destitution and disengagement from the social security system.44 This is illustrated by the case of an
older disabled man who was subject to multiple sanctions. At his wave a interview he was sleeping
rough because benefit sanctions had led to rent arrears and subsequent eviction. Informed that he did
not qualify for hardship payments, he did not receive any social security benefit for several months
due to the application of a six month sanction for missing Work Programme45 appointments:
"I’m homeless, living on the street … I couldn’t pay the rent because I was sanctioned … you can
actually claim housing benefit without jobseekers, but then no-one tells you that then my rent ended
up backing up and because my head was all over the place I just couldn’t deal with it … They made
me go to a Work Programme … I got sanctioned because I missed appointments with them."
(Disabled man, England, wave a)
Two years later, at our wave b interview, he spoke of having lost a new tenancy in the interim period
because of a further benefit sanction and was back rough sleeping. Faced with repeated and
escalating benefit sanctions he had disengaged from the social security system entirely to avoid the
stress associated with claiming benefit which, in turn, exacerbated his depression. He remained
destitute and reliant on charitable provision for food, a sense of purpose and peace of mind:
"It’s just not worth it. Every time you go in, you’re on hooks, like, what’s going to happen now? … I
don’t claim benefits at the moment. I just don’t want to know. Too much of a headache. You know,
you never know from *J.S.S.L. 152 one week to the next whether you’re getting paid and it’s just
proper stress … it’s pointless. ‘Do it. If you don’t, you’re sanctioned’. Things like that. It’s nuts! So,
yes, I just, I don’t sign on anymore … The only thing it has done is make it more difficult basically.
They say, like, it encourages people to go to look for work. No, it doesn’t … I get my breakfast at
[homeless charity]. I work here all day and lunch here. Evenings, there’s different places dotted about
where you can get something to eat … The only place you get any kind of help are charities … [Doing
voluntary work] it’s just helping my state of mind really more than anything." (Disabled man, England,
wave b)
Many, though not all, of the WSUs who took part in the study were experiencing diverse and/or
multiple forms of vulnerability and social exclusion due to issues such as mental and physical health
impairments, homelessness, domestic violence and addiction. Previously, many such vulnerable
people were able to access social security payments, such as Income Support and Incapacity Benefit;
receipt of which was not conditional on the performance of mandatory work related requirements
under the associated threat of sanctions. The case above also has wider resonance when
considering the particularly detrimental impacts that the expansion and intensification of sanction
backed welfare conditionality has for vulnerable people reliant on the basic safety net that social
assistance benefits are meant to provide. For example, the homeless, disabled man above had
previously been living in social housing and in receipt of Income Support for a number of years. His
subsequent fall into destitution had initially come about when his benefit claim was reassessed.
Following a WCA for ESA he was reclassified as "fit for work" and placed on JSA under full work
related requirements, which he subsequently failed to meet, triggering dire consequences. Evidence
indicates that as welfare conditionality has been relentlessly rolled out, it is often the most vulnerable
who pay the heaviest price. This is most graphically illustrated by data generated in an interview with
a young disabled woman living in a homeless hostel. She had previously been a victim of domestic
violence and had a history of drug dependency and associated offending:
"A missed appointment, they said. An appointment that I’d never had, for a medical … They put me
under the sanction … I was on zero income. Zero Housing Benefit, zero Council Tax Benefit. Towards
the end I put in a nil income form, which activated my Housing Benefit temporarily. But I think once I
had nil income for four and a half months … I turned to prostitution. It was the most horrific time of my
life. I got raped. I got raped. I got [hesitates] beaten up, raped and buggered, trying to [hesitates] earn
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money via prostitution. I was working with [two support organisations]. They were liaising with the
benefits as well. It made no difference." (Disabled woman, England, wave a)
Whilst this is an extreme example of the impact that a loss of benefit entitlement can have, and an
illustration of the desperate measures that some people turn to for survival, further analysis revealed
that this dreadful situation was not triggered by a benefit sanction per se. The DWP clearly state: "If
you don’t meet one or more conditions of your benefit claim, without good reason, your benefit could
*J.S.S.L. 153 be stopped or reduced. This is a benefit sanction".46 However, this young woman’s
disentitlement occurred due to a failure to attend her scheduled WCA appointment. She was
consequently deemed ineligible for ESA. Leaving aside discussions about the specifics of what
precisely is, and is not, a benefit sanction, this woman and many other vulnerable respondents in the
study, who for various reasons (e.g. a lack of understanding of the rules, precarious housing
situations, ongoing addiction issues), became subject to welfare conditionality for the first time,
experience the loss of their right to benefit as a "sanction" even when technically a benefit sanction
has not been imposed. The key point here is that in order to capture in full the distress that benefit
sanctions routinely cause, it is necessary to locate an understanding of their emergence and impact
within a wider appreciation of the significance of the extension and normalisation of welfare
conditionality as a key principle of social security benefit delivery. It is this development which UK
governments of all the mainstream political parties have used to justify the extension of work related
requirements and benefit sanctions to groups who were not previously expected to be work active.
Welfare conditionality has thus systematically undermined welfare rights, normalised benefit sanctions
and exacerbated the social insecurity of the most vulnerable members of society.
WSUs frequently reported that benefit sanctions were often applied for relatively minor
transgressions. For example, numerous respondents spoke of sanctions being applied for being a few
minutes late for their specified appointment at the Jobcentre Plus. Others reported that that they did
not understand, often due to reasons related to language, literacy or impairment, why a sanction had
been applied in the first place47:
"[Interpreter] Because he was new to the country he didn’t know all the systems … one day he
missed his appointment when he went the next day they sanctioned him for a month … He’d nothing
even to eat." (Male migrant, Scotland, wave a)
On occasions it appeared that sanctions were inappropriately applied. Sometimes this was a result of
administrative errors by Jobcentre Plus staff or their counterparts delivering the Work Programme.
However, more systemic failings were evident when sanctions were applied despite individuals’
perceiving that they had taken reasonable steps to avoid their application. The most striking example
of this relates to a refugee whose brother died suddenly abroad. Having informed the Jobcentre Plus
that she could not attend a scheduled WFI and receiving assurances that her benefit would not be
affected, she attended the funeral. However, on returning she was sanctioned, a decision that was
upheld despite her attempts to have it overturned:
"I had an appointment with them, I phoned them saying ‘I’ve got a problem … My brother who died in
[location] and I’m there it’s the burial ceremony, you understand?’… They said, ‘No don’t worry, if you
come back, just call us back’, and then ten days, I phoned them back … They say, no, they have
*J.S.S.L. 154 to send it to the decision board to see and then they send me a letter after saying that I
have to be sanctioned … that wasn’t human." (Female UC recipient, England, wave c)
Another woman received a sanction for being late for a Jobcentre Plus appointment because she had
accompanied her daughter to a hospital appointment for cancer treatment. On attempting to explain
why she was delayed she was told:
"‘Well your daughter turned 18 three weeks ago, she’s all right to go herself [now]’. I said it’s still my
child, she’s going through that; but no they sanctioned me anyway." (Female Jobseeker, Scotland,
wave a)
The disproportionate and inappropriate application of benefit sanctions created deep resentment and
a clear sense of injustice among WSUs.
Benefit sanctions: an effective tool for moving people into paid work?
Leaving aside the hardships that sanctions cause, the question of their effectiveness in moving
people into work requires consideration. Several European studies have found that those who had
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experienced a benefit sanction were more likely to re-enter paid work48 and that stricter sanctioning
regimes are likely to trigger higher rates of re-engagement with the paid labour market.49 However,
other studies point to benefit sanctions having less positive effects in relation to entry and progression
within paid work. A study in Wisconsin, US found sanctions had a limited impact on exit rates from
social assistance50 and others report the application of a benefit sanction is likely to result in longer
periods out of work and subsequent entry into less well paid and insecure jobs.51 Whilst two
international evidence reviews52 found some evidence that sanctions applied to unemployment
benefits could raise unemployment benefit exit and job entry levels in the short term, they also note
unfavourable longer-term outcomes in relation to "earnings, job quality and employment retention".53
Recent UK evidence questions the efficacy of benefit sanctions in moving people off social security
benefits and into work. Whilst the increasing use of benefit sanctions may lead to growing numbers
exiting unemployment benefit, statistical analyses highlights that the majority of those who left JSA
did not enter paid work *J.S.S.L. 155 but rather sanctions served to distance people from collective
social support,54 pushing disabled people in particular, "further way from the Labour market". 55 Much
evidence points to the limited value and ineffectiveness of conditionality more broadly, and benefit
sanctions in particular, in reducing the disability employment gap and enabling people with
impairments into paid work.56 Some commentators suggest that their use is actually more likely to
exacerbate existing illness and/or push disabled people further away from employment.57
The WelCond study provides further strong evidence that benefit sanctions are routinely and
fundamentally ineffective in triggering or sustaining movements into paid work among benefit
recipients. Benefit sanctions did little to enhance people’s motivation to prepare for, seek or enter paid
work. On the contrary, for substantial numbers, the threat or application of a sanction initiated and
sustained a range of negative behaviour changes and outcomes that were more likely to undermine
the possibility of them working in the future. As noted in the previous section some, particularly those
with mental health impairments became seriously unwell, while other vulnerable claimants unable to
cope with the inherent hassle and ongoing threat of a sanction disengaged from the social security
system altogether. When benefit sanctions were applied, they often had a detrimental effect on
claimants’ ability to actively seek work:
"Sanctions, I think they have held me back from being able to look for work … I wasn’t able to get out
and look for work further away." (Male UC, recipient, England wave b)
A minority, particularly those with histories of offending,58 moved into survival crime following sanction:
"I had to go and do things I didn’t want to do … because 13 weeks with no money and food vouchers
… it’s commercial burglaries basically." (Male offender, England, wave c) *J.S.S.L. 156
Drug dealing … that sanction … turned me to crime … after that I was making that much money I
didn’t need their [benefit] money." (Homeless man, Scotland, wave c)
More generally, the widespread application of compulsory full-time (up to 35 hours per week) work
search requirements established a counterproductive culture of compliance.59 Fearful of being
sanctioned for non-compliance, many prioritised meeting the specified conditions of their claim before
more meaningful job search activities. This was not because people were workshy, rather it was a
practical response to ongoing anxieties about the deeply negative outcomes that a sanction would
bring and the necessity of doing as they were instructed to retain eligibility to their benefit:
"All they [Jobcoach] cared about was ‘Make sure you’ve got x amount of applications that you’ve
applied for, that you can prove you’ve applied for and you’ve put on Universal Jobmatch’." (Male
Offender, England, wave c)
Cases where respondents spoke of a benefit sanction pushing them into, or closer to, work were
extremely rare. Less than a handful of the 481 WSUs recruited to take part in the study reported that
the experience or threat of a benefit sanction activated them to move off benefits into employment.
One man detailed how his hatred of the "whole Jobcentre Plus and Work Programme and sanctions"
(Offender, England, wave c) had underpinned his move into self-employment. Additionally, at her
wave b interview another woman, a UC recipient, said she had responded to the omnipresent threat
of a sanction by taking a job. However, 12 months later her she was again unemployed due to the
return of her longstanding depression, which the job had exacerbated. Across the duration of the
study, the single standout example of someone stating that a benefit sanction had a positive impact
on their motivation to seek work came from a man who was initially impoverished and extremely
angry about being sanctioned:
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"[Wave a Interview] I got sanctioned by the Jobcentre Plus because I didn’t have a note from the
hospital stating that I was in hospital after trying to take my life. They’re supposed to help people get
work, but they don’t …
[Wave c interview] Gave me the kick up the arse I needed to get a job … it made me more
determined in finding a job working my arse off and being a better person than what the Jobcentre
Plus made me out to be." (Male UC Recipient, England, waves a, c)
Although he had changed his view on benefit sanctions by wave c, it should be noted that across the
two years of the study this respondent, like a number of others, had an employment pattern
characterised by recurrent short-term movements between various insecure jobs interspersed with
periods reliant on social security benefit, as contracts ended or illness intervened, rather than
long-term benefit receipt. His endorsement of sanctions and trying to be ‘a better person than what
the Jobcentre Plus made me out to be’ is redolent of evidence reported elsewhere, *J.S.S.L. 157 that
those exposed to conditionality and sanctions internalise its logic and blame personal failings rather
than wider structural factors for their lack of work.60
Conclusions
Analysis of the new empirical data generated from the WelCond study, one of the largest of its kind
undertaken to date, alongside evidence from myriad smaller scale, but nonetheless significant
studies, clearly evidences the severely negative, material, health and housing outcomes that
consistently ensue when social security rights are removed or diminished by the application of benefit
sanctions. Additionally, much of the evidence discussed in this paper directly challenges assertions
that highly conditional, sanctions backed, social security regimes are effective in increasing benefit
recipients’ engagement with paid work. Moreover, a host of recent UK studies have found sanctions
backed conditionality to be especially ineffective and inappropriate when applied to vulnerable people,
many of whom subsequently disengage from the social assistance system and rely on charitable or
informal provisions or survival crime to meet their basic needs.61 More generally sanctions encourage
a wider culture of compliance whereby benefit recipients, understandably, primarily focus on meeting
the conditions of their claim to avoid a sanction rather than effectively searching for work. This is a
somewhat ironic and unintentional outcome for an approach that is intended to reduce reliance on
social welfare benefits and promote paid work.
However, internationally, many policymakers continue to justify the use and expansion of benefit
sanctions for ideological or electoral reasons, whilst turning a blind eye to mounting evidence about
the extreme hardship they cause and their ineffectiveness in moving people off welfare and into
sustained paid work.62 Within and beyond the UK there is a pressing need for policymakers to
abandon the rhetoric of individual irresponsibility and the futile obsession with enforcing behaviour
change through benefit sanction regimes. Social security policy needs to be fundamentally
refocussed to offer support that challenges the contemporary and complex social inequalities that
continue to structure the realities of people’s lives. Such a shift is unlikely to occur whilst the
preoccupation with welfare conditionality continues to promote and propagate policies essentially
designed to "punish" poor and vulnerable people reliant on working age social security benefits.63
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